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FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CHILDCARE
PARENTS
JEFFREY A. PARNESS†
California law, like nature itself, makes no provision for dual
fatherhood.1
[A] court may find . . . more than two persons with a claim to
parentage . . . if . . . recognizing only two parents would be
detrimental to the child.2

INTRODUCTION
In context, the first quote, from a United States Supreme
Court opinion, concluded there could be no dual paternity in
California for federal constitutional childcare purposes. Such
childcare encompasses the principle that parents, as defined by
state law, have superior rights, under the United States
Constitution, to the “care, custody, and control” of their children.3
†
Emeritus Professor, Northern Illinois University College of Law. B.A., Colby
College; J.D., The University of Chicago. An early draft of this Article was presented
at the Sixth Annual Constitutional Law Colloquium on November 7, 2015 at Loyola
University Chicago School of Law. The Article has benefitted greatly from the
reviews by Professors Marc D. Falkoff, Daniel S. McConkie, Jr., Heidi Frostestad
Kuehl, and Laurel A. Rigertas. Danny Mark, Matt Cole, Randall Roelfsema, David
A. Saxe, and Alex Yorko provided excellent research assistance. All errors are mine.
1
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 118 (1989) (plurality opinion). Cf. id. at
162 (White, J., joined by Brennan, J., dissenting) (“It is hardly rare in this world of
divorce and remarriage for a child to live with the ‘father’ to whom her mother is
married, and still have a relationship with her biological father.”).
2
CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(c) (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess. and ch. 8 of
2015–2016 2d Exec. Sess.); see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-a, § 1853 (Westlaw
through 2015 2d Reg. Sess. of the 127th Leg.) (“[A] court may determine that a child
has more than 2 parents.”). Case law has also permitted three childcare parents in
the absence of statute. See, e.g., In re M.W., 292 P.3d 1158, 1162 (Colo. App. 2012)
(concluding psychological parent shared custody with two biological parents); T.E.B.
v. C.A.B., 2013 PA Super 211, 74 A.3d 170, 178–79 (finding shared custody between
biological father, presumptive father—the husband—and birth mother); Jacob v.
Shultz-Jacob, 2007 PA Super 118, ¶¶ 21–26, 923 A.2d 473, 481–82 (concluding
custody shared between birth mother, her same-sex partner, and the sperm donor
who served as a parent in an assisted human reproduction birth).
3
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–66 (2000) (plurality opinion); see also id.
at 77 (Souter, J., concurring) (“We have long recognized that a parent’s interests in
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The second quote, from a more recent California statute,
recognizes there can be dual or triple paternity or maternity,
though nature alone usually does not allow a second biological
father or mother.4 Thus, this quote suggests that “nature itself”
need not always accompany a finding of legal parentage outside
of formal adoption. It allows function to supplement or trump
actual or presumed biological ties—for example, marital
paternity presumptions—as an avenue to legal parentage, and
invites legal parentage by agreement.
Functional and contractual parents are proliferating in the
United States, both in and outside of “dual parenthood.”5 Today,
in California and elsewhere, “nature itself” does not foreclose the
possibility of not only three parents for a child, but also of only
two female parents or only two male parents, where some or all
have no biological ties to the child.6

the nurture, upbringing, companionship, care, and custody of children are generally
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); id. at 87
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Our cases leave no doubt that parents have a fundamental
liberty interest in caring for and guiding their children . . . .”); id. at 95 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]here is a beginning point that commands general, perhaps
unanimous, agreement in our separate opinions: As our case law has developed, the
custodial parent has a constitutional right to determine, without undue interference
by the state, how best to raise, nurture, and educate the child. The parental right
stems from the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”).
4
With unnatural help, there can be dual paternity or maternity in limited
settings. See, e.g., CHARLES P. KINDREGAN, JR. & MAUREEN MCBRIEN, ASSISTED
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY: A LAWYER’S GUIDE TO EMERGING LAW AND SCIENCE
42 (2d ed. 2011) (describing the “blended intrauterine insemination” process with a
few cases); see also Yehezkel Margalit et al., The New Frontier of Advanced
Reproductive Technology: Reevaluating Modern Legal Parenthood, 37 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 107, 131–32 (2014) (describing technologies allowing a child to be born with
“the genetic material of three men and three women”). As the statute references
“persons” with parentage claims, it also contemplates the possibility of triple
maternity, triple paternity, or three parents who each are unaligned with a
particular gender. Here, too, nature alone does not itself prompt parentage under
law. Consider, for example, mitochondrial replacement therapy, which involves
nuclear DNA from an original egg and mitochondrial DNA from a donor egg, to
prompt a childbirth wherein the intended parents are lesbian couples who are not
egg donors. See, e.g., Amy B. Leiser, Note, Parentage Disputes in the Age of
Mitochondrial Replacement Therapy, 104 GEO. L.J. 413, 416–17 (2016).
5
See generally CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 2013 ASSISTED
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY NATIONAL SUMMARY REPORT (2015), http://www.cdc.
gov/art/pdf/2013-report/art_2013_national_summary_report.pdf.
6
See Margalit et al., supra note 4, at 110–11.
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The quotes also suggest that American state lawmakers
control parenthood issues for purposes of determining federal
constitutional childcare. As these federal constitutional parental
childcare rights are fundamental, they cannot be easily
overridden by state legislators or judges even if their quite
reasonable goal is to protect the child by serving the child’s best
interests.7 Parents defined by state law hold significantly
protected federal constitutional childcare rights.8 Of course,
state parental childcare rights can extend, though not limit,
federal constitutional parental childcare.9
Left
unexplained
is
how
federal
constitutional
rightsholders10 came to be largely defined by state laws.11
Typically, federal—often Supreme Court—precedents define
federal constitutional rightsholders,12 as well as the substantive
7
See, e.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72–73 (plurality opinion) (“As we have explained,
the Due Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the fundamental right
of parents to make child rearing decisions simply because a state judge believes a
‘better’ decision could be made.”).
8
Federal constitutional childcare rights have been read to encompass custodial
interests, so that once custody of a child has been awarded to one parent, the other
parent has no federal constitutional childcare rights to visitation. Uwadiegwu v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 91 F. Supp. 3d 391, 398 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (finding noncustodial
parent has no federal constitutional right to intimate association with his or her
child where there was no termination of parental rights, that is, no “wholesale
relinquishment” of the parent’s rights with respect to his or her child and where
there was a visitation opportunity that was not “shocking, arbitrary, and egregious,”
though the noncustodial parent would need to travel from New York to Mississippi
to visit).
9
See, e.g., Callender v. Skiles, 591 N.W.2d 182, 192 (Iowa 1999) (following
dissent in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), and finding putative
biological father has waivable Iowa constitutional right to challenge paternity
presumption favoring husband of birth mother where her marriage remains intact);
In Interest of J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d 189, 198 (Tex. 1994) (holding that the Texas
Constitution protects against denying all putative fathers standing to sue in
paternity regarding a child born into a marriage between others).
10
Herein the term “rightsholders” is employed, though not typically used by
courts or commentators. While state courts often speak of “standing” to seek courtordered childcare, that term is often confusing. See, e.g., Daniel Townsend, Who
Should Define Injuries for Article III Standing?, 68 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 76, 77
(2015) (reviewing U.S. Supreme Court precedents requiring that a plaintiff suing to
enjoin unconstitutional governmental action “be injured in order to have standing”).
11
These laws often chiefly originate in statutes and judicial precedents. Seldom
do these state parentage laws arise via state constitutional law directives. But see,
e.g., Callender, 591 N.W.2d at 192.
12
For an excellent review of how the Supreme Court has defined federal
constitutional rightsholders, especially as to corporations, aliens, and felons, see Zoë
Robinson, Constitutional Personhood, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 605, 619 (2016)
(outlining a unified approach for federal constitutional personhood determinations).
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and enforcement aspects of such constitutional rights. There is
general uniformity nationwide, per federal cases, among the
criminally accused,13 gun toters,14 and abortion seekers15 who
possess and enforce the same federal constitutional rights.16
Thus, for example, the definition of which women have a right to
abort does not vary much from state to state.17
Why are the requisites for federal constitutional child
caretakers largely left to state lawmakers? Both Supreme Court
and congressional explanations, when offered, fail to justify the
extreme deference and the resulting significant interstate
variations as to who is a parent for federal constitutional
parental childcare purposes. These very broad variations in who
possesses fundamental federal constitutional rights are unique to
the childcare setting, causing many problems for children and
those who care for them. These problems would be mitigated if
child caretakers, like the criminally accused, gun owners, and
abortion seekers, were more precisely defined by federal
13
The right of the criminally accused to a Sixth Amendment jury trial applies to
state criminal cases. Yet, it is inapplicable to “petty crimes,” though there can be
exceptions under federal constitutional precedents. See, e.g., Blanton v. City of N.
Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541 n.4 (1989); cf. Bado v. United States, 120 A.3d 50, 63
(D.C. Cir.), vacated, 125 A.3d 1119 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (mem.).
14
See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010) (holding
Second Amendment right to bear arms is applicable to states); District of Columbia
v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580 (2008) (finding “people” holding the right to bear arms
“unambiguously refers to all members of the political community, not an unspecified
subset”); Walker v. United States, 800 F.3d 720, 727 (6th Cir. 2015) (finding person
possessing right to bear arms can lose it by becoming a felon and not having federal
civil rights restored, per 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)).
15
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992)
(finding states cannot place a “substantial obstacle” in paths of those seeking
abortions); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 424, 427 (1990) (concluding minors
have abortion right though exercise of the right can be subject to some state
regulation, including prior parental notice or, in the alternative, obtaining a judicial
bypass of this notice requirement).
16
Certainly, those possessing federal constitutional rights may have those
rights limited in particular contexts, as with adults who choose to work in settings
involving drugs, interdiction, or the need to carry a firearm. See Bd. of Educ. v.
Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (discussing adults working with public school children
participating in extracurricular activities); see also Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v.
Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 670–71 (1989).
17
See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 899 (holding that, while all women have the right
to an abortion, the state can regulate differently the exercises of that right by
women under the age of eighteen). There are different state laws regulating access
to abortion by all rightsholders, which are often criticized. See, e.g., Katherine Shaw
& Alex Stein, Abortion, Informed Consent, and Regulatory Spillover, 92 IND. L.J.
(forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 4–5), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2679373.
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lawmakers. The Supreme Court, not Congress, should provide
more precise definitions. New cases should address the open
questions that forestall complete uniformity as to who constitutes
a federal constitutional parental child caretaker.18 This Article
explores the questions that implicate biological, functional, and
contractual legal parents, and how such a resolution by the
Supreme Court would benefit child caretakers, their children,
and the country overall.19
I.

THE FEW FEDERAL CONSTRAINTS ON STATE PARENTAL
CHILDCARE LAWS

Undoubtedly, the United States Supreme Court has set
limits on state parentage laws akin to federal constitutional
parental childcare rights. And there are some congressional
enactments further unifying parental childcare interests across
the country. Still, sharp interstate contrasts are expanding
quickly without significant intervention by federal lawmakers.
To date, there has been no perceived “ ‘major damage’ to ‘clear
and substantial’ ” federal interests in the increasing state
parental childcare variations.20
Federal lawmakers are
seemingly content—or at least silent—for now on the differing
state law definitions of parents who possess federal
constitutional childcare rights. The United States Constitution,
the Supreme Court, or Congress may each constrain state
parental childcare lawmaking.

18
Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. F.
16, 24 (2015) (recognizing “the difficulty of deciding between more gradually building
a solid foundation for the recognition of new constitutional rights and immediately
addressing serious indignities and other harms”). This Article posits that current
variations in American state childcare parent laws are causing “impermissible
geographic variation[s] in the meaning of federal law.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.
Ct. 2584, 2606 (2015).
19
Concededly, not everyone laments upon the current broad lawmaking
authority over parental childcare now vested in American state lawmakers. Some
wish even broader authority. E.g., Samantha Godwin, Against Parental Rights, 47
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 81 (2015) (“An essential part of long-term reform of
American family law should include eroding and ultimately overruling existing case
law holding that parents have a constitutionally protected substantive due process
right to the custody and control of their children. . . . Ending due process-based
constitutional rights for parents would free up the states to consider different
parental rights regimes.”).
20
Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979) (quoting United States v.
Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966)).
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The Federal Constitution

Within the United States Constitution’s Bill of Rights, there
is no explicit recognition of parental childcare interests or of
congressional authority to define such interests. For enumerated
rights like speech,21 press,22 and religion,23 the Constitution is
silent on affirmative congressional authority, though it
constrains that authority. For the Civil Rights Amendments on
involuntary servitude,24 equal protection,25 due process,26 and
voting,27 the Constitution provides that Congress has the
affirmative power “to enforce [those rights] . . . by appropriate
legislation.”28
So, whether or not Congress has any say on enforcement of
federal constitutional rights, be they enumerated or
unenumerated, the Supreme Court largely determines who
rightsholders are and what rights they hold.29 As for who the
rightsholders are, the Constitution itself provides some direction
to the Court, as certain rights are held by “the people,”30 while
others are held by “citizens”31 or by persons.32 The Constitution
provides no explicit direction when rights are based in limits on
governmental authority.33

21

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id. amend. XIII, § 1.
25
Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
26
Id.
27
Id. amend. XV, § 1.
28
Id. amend. XIII, § 2; id. amend. XV, § 2; see also id. amend. XIV, § 5.
29
Of course, high court precedents on rightsholders are sometimes surprising,
as when free speech rights were accorded to corporations. See Citizens United v.
Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (recognizing First Amendment
speech protections for corporations); Kent Greenfield, In Defense of Corporate
Persons, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 309, 312 (2015) (reviewing criticisms while urging
that corporate personhood needs “a more nuanced analysis” and suggesting
“adjustments in corporate governance rather than constitutional law”).
30
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. IV (unreasonable search and seizure).
31
See, e.g., id. amend. XV, § 1 (voting).
32
See, e.g., id. amend. V (double jeopardy, self-incrimination, and due process,
among others).
33
Id. amend. I. (Congress shall not prohibit the free exercise of religion nor
abridge the freedom of speech). For another review of the varying explicit federal
constitutional approaches to federal constitutional rightsholders, see Robinson,
supra note 12, at 609–10.
22

2016] FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CHILDCARE PARENTS

971

All federal constitutional rights are “the supreme Law of the
Land,” binding upon “Judges in every State.”34 For these rights,
generally the rightsholders, the rights held, and the enforcement
avenues vary insignificantly interstate.
There are some
differences between the states on the federal constitutional rights
of those “accused” criminally,35 those contesting illegal searches,36
and those with family-related privacy interests in abortion37 and
marriage.38
Yet, for one federal constitutional right, the rightsholders—
but neither the protections afforded by the right nor the
enforcement of the right—significantly differ interstate. The
relatively uniform federal constitutional approach to the
attributes of parental childcare rights39 contrasts sharply with
the proliferation of interstate variations in defining the parents
possessing such rights. The Supreme Court recognizes broad
discretion in the states to define federal constitutional parental

34

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
Id. amend. VI; see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (“Because
we believe that trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental . . . we hold that the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases which—
were they to be tried in a federal court—would come within the Sixth Amendment’s
guarantee.”).
36
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133–34 (1978)
(holding that passengers in a searched automobile, who had no ownership interest in
the automobile or in property seized from the automobile, had no legitimate
expectation of privacy, and noting that Fourth Amendment rights are personal and
enforceable only by those whose rights were infringed); see also New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 338, 341–43 (1985) (distinguishing prisoners, who “retain no
legitimate expectations of privacy in their cells,” from school children (citing
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 669–70 (1977)), and finding school children have
some privacy expectations, to be determined by a court in a given case via a
“reasonableness standard” that applies nationwide).
37
Compare, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 70/15 (West, Westlaw through Act
99-930 of the 2016 Reg. Sess.) (providing that parents of unemancipated minor to be
notified prior to minor’s abortion), with MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-53 (LEXIS through
2016 Reg. Sess., 1st Extra. Sess., and 2d Extra. Sess.) (stating that consent of both
parents are required for abortion performed on an unemancipated minor).
38
Compare, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-102 (LEXIS through 2016 2d Extra.
Sess., 2016 Fiscal Sess., and 2016 3d Extra. Sess. of the 90th Gen. Assemb.)
(establishing that male who is seventeen can marry with parental consent), with
COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-106 (LEXIS through 2016 2d Reg. Sess. of the 70th Gen.
Assemb.) (establishing that a male who is sixteen or seventeen can marry with
consent of both parents).
39
See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (addressing parental
childcare rights when grandparents seek visitation rights).
35
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childcare rightsholders, which has resulted in varying state law
definitions of parentage for federal constitutional childcare
purposes.40
B.

United States Supreme Court Precedent

While the leeway afforded to state lawmakers is broad, their
given discretion to define federal childcare parents is not
boundless. A few Supreme Court precedents do limit state
definitional authority.41 Thus, to date, all women who bear
children as a result of sex are parents at birth with federal
constitutional childcare interests.42 However, all men who, via
sex, impregnate women who later bear children are not
necessarily such parents. Where birth mothers are unmarried,
biological fathers only have a federally protected opportunity
interest in establishing parenthood in order to be heard later on
childcare,43 with the establishment requisites largely left to state
lawmakers.44 The requisites for exercising childcare parenthood
opportunities vary significantly interstate.45 Incidentally, legal
parenthood under state law often varies intrastate, including in
contexts where the court must determine parents for child
support and for crimes.46
The Supreme Court has given states the discretion whether
to afford any parental childcare opportunities to biological
fathers of children born of adulterous sex.47 Where states afford
40

See id. at 73.
See Tuan Anh Nguyen v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. 53,
62–64 (2001).
42
See, e.g., id. at 72–73 (holding no equal protection violation in treating
biologically tied men and women differently in parentage laws on childcare).
43
Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256 (1983) (finding in most cases state laws
determine child custody issues).
44
See, e.g., id. (“Rules governing . . . child custody . . . vary from State to
State.”).
45
See, e.g., Mary Beck, Toward a National Putative Father Registry Database,
25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1031, 1057–68 (2002) (discussing variations in state uses
of putative father registries in adoption cases involving required notices to unwed
biological fathers).
46
See, e.g., N.E. v. Hedges, 391 F.3d 832, 836 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding biological
father, “no matter how removed he may be emotionally from the child,” may still
have “duties of support under state law” to a child placed for adoption by his
mother); State v. Paradis, 2010 ME 141, ¶ 6, 10 A.3d 695, 696–97 (holding biological
father with no childcare opportunity may nevertheless be prosecuted for sexual acts
as a parent to his child/victim).
47
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 131 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(recognizing such discretion, as long as a state law serves “a legitimate end by
41
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such
opportunities
notwithstanding
marital
paternity
presumptions, the associated requirements differ.48 For example,
Pennsylvania is at least one state that generally denies any
parental childcare rights to such biological fathers, so that a
biological father has no standing to rebut a marital paternity
presumption.49 Iowa, however, recognizes state constitutional
parental childcare rights in such a biological father.50
Broad state lawmaking discretion in defining those with
federal parental childcare rights emanates, in particular, from
three major Supreme Court cases. One is Lehr v. Robertson,
where an unwed biological father of a child born of sex to an
unwed mother sought to participate in an adoption proceeding
There, the Court
involving the mother’s new husband.51
recognized that state lawmakers could vary in their norms on
denying such a father any participation right and veto power.52
While the Court recognized that the “intangible fibers that
connect parent and child” via biology “are sufficiently vital to
merit constitutional protection in appropriate cases,” it concluded
that in “the vast majority of cases, state law determines the final
outcome” when resolving “the legal problems arising from the

rational means”). Since Michael H., where the unwed biological father was generally
then not permitted under California law to seek to rebut a marital paternity
presumption favored by the married couple, id. at 124, even where the biological
father had “an established parental relationship,” id. at 123, California law has
changed so as to allow some rebuttals by unwed biological fathers. CAL. FAM.
CODE § 7541(a) (West, Westlaw through ch. 893 of the 2016 Reg. Sess. and ch. 8 of
the 2015–2016 2d Exec. Sess.).
48
See, e.g., Paula Roberts, Truth and Consequences: Part II. Questioning the
Paternity of Marital Children, 37 FAM. L.Q. 55 app. F at 94–95 (2003) (Recent State
Statutes Allowing Paternity Disestablishment of Marital Children).
49
See, e.g., Strauser v. Stahr, 726 A.2d 1052, 1055–56 (Pa. 1999) (holding no
rebuttal by unwed biological father where marriage continues).
50
See, e.g., Callender v. Skiles, 591 N.W.2d 182, 190 (Iowa 1999) (holding
unwed biological father has “a liberty interest in challenging paternity” under Iowa
Constitution). Marital presumption statutes are reviewed in June Carbone & Naomi
Cahn, Marriage, Parentage, and Child Support, 45 FAM. L.Q. 219, 222–28 (2011).
51
463 U.S. 248, 250 (1983).
52
See id. at 267.
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parent-child relationship.”53 Before and since Lehr, American
states have varied regarding the participation rights of unwed
biological fathers in formal adoption proceedings.54
Another precedent is Michael H. v. Gerald D., where an
unwed biological father of a child born of sex to a married woman
sought to undo the state marital paternity presumption favoring
the husband.55 The Court ruled that California could deny, as it
then did, the biological father any opportunity interest in
establishing childcare parentage, at least where the state desired
to promote the married couple’s wish to remain an intact nuclear
family.56 While California public policy has since changed,57 in
Pennsylvania a legal parentage pursuit of a comparable
biological father can be thwarted by an intact nuclear family.58
Both before and since Michael H., American states have varied in
their approaches to establishing as well as disestablishing
marital parentage presumptions.59
53
Id. at 256. The Court also noted that “[r]ules governing . . . child custody are
generally specified in statutory enactments that vary from State to State.” Id. In
United States v. Yazell, where no federal constitutional protections were asserted,
the Court found “no need for uniformity,” and “solicitude for state interests,
particularly in the field of family” “should be overridden by the federal courts only
where clear and substantial interests of the National Government . . . will suffer
major damage if the state law is applied.” 382 U.S. 341, 352, 357 (1966).
54
See generally Jeffrey A. Parness, Participation of Unwed Biological Fathers in
Newborn Adoptions: Achieving Substantive and Procedural Fairness, 5 J.L. & FAM.
STUD. 223 (2003) (critically reviewing state laws).
55
491 U.S. 110, 113 (1989) (plurality opinion).
56
Id. at 124.
57
CAL. FAM. CODE § 7541(a) (West, Westlaw through ch. 893 of the 2016 Reg.
Sess. and ch. 8 of the 2015–2016 2d Exec. Sess.) (providing that paternity of husband
may be rebutted with “evidence based on blood tests”).
58
Strauser v. Stahr, 726 A.2d 1052, 1054 (Pa. 1999) (holding biological fathers
cannot seek to rebut marital presumption favoring paternity of husband as long as
marriage is intact and spouses want to maintain presumption).
59
As to establishment, marital parentage presumptions can be based on birth or
conception during marriage. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2114(a) (West,
Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess. of the 98th Leg.). As to disestablishment, marital
parentage presumptions may only be rebuttable by the wife or husband. See, e.g.,
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.070(1)(b), (2) (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-607(1) (West, Westlaw through 2016 3d Spec. Sess.)
(assuming a commitment to stay married and to raise the child as an issue of the
marriage). In some states, however, in the context of disestablishment, marital
parentage presumptions may be subject to rebuttal by the biological father, though
standards can be unclear. See, e.g., In re Parentage of John M., 817 N.E.2d 500, 506
(Ill. 2004); Waites v. Ritchie (In re Waites), 2012-CT-00884-SCT (¶ 14) (Miss. 2014),
152 So. 3d 306, 311 (holding biological father can seek custody as long as no
abandonment, unfitness, or the like). Recently, some lower courts have applied
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The third Supreme Court precedent is Troxel v. Granville,
where the attributes of superior parental rights were at issue,
rather than the norms for establishing such rights.60 The case
involved grandparents who sought a court order on grandparentgrandchild visits over parental objections.61 In limiting judicial
opportunity to override parental desires, a few opinions of a
splintered Court recognized broad state lawmaking discretion on
parentage and parent-like classes.62 There was mention of child
visitation laws benefitting third parties, that is, nonparents, via
“gradations,”63 as well as of possible “de facto” parenthood,64 a
parentage establishment norm involving neither biological ties
nor formal adoption.65 Before and since Troxel, American state
de facto and comparable parentage laws vary in defining who
becomes federal constitutional childcare parents.66
There are significant interstate variations today in both
parentage establishment and disestablishment norms relevant to
federal constitutional parental childcare rights.
Parentage
establishment norms go by varying terms, including not only de
facto parent, but also equitable adoption, presumed parent, and
marital parentage presumptions in childcare settings to lesbian spouses of birth
mothers, even when the relevant statutes speak of husbands and presumed
biological ties. See, e.g., Elizabeth D. v. San Diego Cty. Health & Human Servs.
Agency (In re D.S.), 143 Cal. Rptr. 3d 918, 924 (Ct. App. 2012).
60
530 U.S. 57, 60 (2000) (plurality opinion). An early Supreme Court precedent
in a case involving a childcare dispute between a parent and a grandparent had
suggested there could be no federal law on establishing parental rights. Ex parte
Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 594 (1890) (“As to the right to the control and possession of
this child, as it is contested by its father and its grandfather, it is one in regard to
which neither the congress of the United States, nor any authority of the United
States, has any special jurisdiction.”).
61
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60.
62
Id. at 93 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 101 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
63
Id. at 93 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
64
Id. at 101 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia, in dissent, recognized
Justice Kennedy’s solution as a possible, but ill-advised, “judicially crafted
definition” of a federal constitutional childcare parent. Id. at 92.
65
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c) (LEXIS through 80 Del. Laws
2016, ch. 430) (exercise of “parental responsibility” with “support and consent of the
child’s parent”); D.C. CODE § 16-831.01(1) (LEXIS through Dec. 7, 2016) (single
parent’s “agreement” and residency in same household).
66
See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, Parentage Law (R)Evolution: The Key Questions,
59 WAYNE L. REV. 743, 752–63 (2013) [hereinafter Parness, Parentage Law
(R)Evolution]. Of course, beyond Troxel there can be additional state constitutional
law protections of parental childcare interests. See, e.g., Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d
573, 579 (Tenn. 1993) (holding state constitutional right to privacy in parenting
decisions).
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parent by estoppel.67 Similarly, for parentage disestablishment
there are differing terms, including rebuttal and rescission,
usually depending on how parentage was initially established.68
While there are distinct state law norms on establishing and
disestablishing legal parentage relevant to federal constitutional
parental childcare, generally the holders of other federal
constitutional rights are uniform across state borders. The
criminally accused, whose rights include effective assistance of
counsel, trial by jury, and speedy trial,69 do not vary widely
interstate.70 Nor are there generally major interstate differences
in religious practitioners,71 those subject only to reasonable
searches,72 and gun toters.73
The Supreme Court is capable of crafting norms on federal
constitutional parental childcare rightsholders.
With state
terminations of existing parental childcare interests, the Court
has actively set uniform federal constitutional norms.74 It cannot
be that federal constitutional childcare rightsholders necessarily
must be left to state law definitions per the Tenth Amendment’s
reservation of powers, since the Supreme Court has substantially
federalized other personal privacy rights, including abortion,75
contraception,76 sexual conduct,77 and marriage.78

67

See, e.g., Parness, Parentage Law (R)Evolution, supra note 66.
Marital paternity presumptions are often subject to rebuttal. See, e.g., ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-814(C) (Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. Sess. of the 52d Leg.).
Voluntary paternity acknowledgments, by contrast, are subject to rescission, as
driven by federal welfare subsidy policies found in 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(5)(D) (2012).
69
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (like Congress, states may not enact laws abrogating
a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights).
70
See, e.g., Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 222 (1967) (holding speedy
trial right applies in state criminal cases).
71
U.S. CONST. amend. I; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940)
(holding like Congress, states may not enact laws prohibiting the free exercise of
religion).
72
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961) (holding
exclusionary rule applicable in state criminal cases).
73
U.S. CONST. amend. II; McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767
(2010).
74
See, e.g., Santosky II v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 748 (1982) (holding clear and
convincing evidence needed to prove child “permanently neglected”); Lassiter v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 30–31 (1981) (holding guidelines on when counsel
must be made available for parents facing state initiatives to terminate parental
rights).
75
See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
76
See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 503–04 (1965) (White, J.,
concurring).
68
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Congressional Enactments

The broad discretion held by American state lawmakers
regarding parentage prompting federal constitutional parental
childcare rights79 generally has not been limited much by
Congressional enforcement authority might be
Congress.80
employed, however.81 Yet, its reach is narrow. Enforcement
authority is only legitimate when employed to remedy and deter
Fourteenth Amendment violations, even if prophylactic in that
the legislation prohibits “a somewhat broader swath of conduct,
including that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment’s
text.”82 But such authority cannot work “a substantive change in
the governing law,”83 meaning there can be no “substantive
redefinition” of Supreme Court precedents on Fourteenth
Amendment rights.84 Further, congressional exercise of this
enforcement authority requires “a relevant history and pattern of
constitutional violations.”85
Congressional authority regarding federal expenditures
could also be used to help unify federal constitutional parent
childcare norms.86 Congressional concerns regarding federally
subsidized state welfare assistance has already led to uniform
77
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 585 (2003) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
78
See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015). Granted, not
all federal constitutional childcare rightsholders have been explicitly deemed subject
to state law definitions. To date, the Supreme Court has not directly addressed
childcare rights when children are born of assisted reproduction. See, e.g., Kimberly
M. Mutcherson, Procreative Pluralism, 30 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 22, 25
(2015) (arguing for federal constitutional protections of assisted reproduction,
though distinguishing noncoital procreation between those wishing to procreate and
parent, and those wishing to procreate for profit).
79
David D. Meyer, Partners, Care Givers, and the Constitutional Substance of
Parenthood, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE’S PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION 47, 55 (Robin Fretwell
Wilson ed., 2006) (recognizing “the [Federal] Constitution’s substantial indifference
to how states assign parent status”).
80
On what Congress has done—and should do—regarding family status
determinations, see, for example, Courtney G. Joslin, Federalism and Family Status,
90 IND. L.J. 787, 790–91 (2015).
81
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
82
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000).
83
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997).
84
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 520 (2004).
85
Id. at 521 (citing Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368
(2001)); see also Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank,
527 U.S. 627, 647–48 (1999).
86
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (congressional taxing and spending authority).
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voluntary paternity-acknowledgment standards across the
country.87 But here, reimbursements of expended federal welfare
dollars were the targets, rather than the establishment of more
uniform parentage norms.88
Congressional authority regarding interstate commerce,89
and perhaps other acts with significant national implications,90
might also be employed, as with establishing guidelines for
sperm banks and assisted reproduction clinics providing services
for people from throughout the country.91 Yet, such guidance
may not—and likely could not, per the aforementioned limited
enforcement authority of Congress—address uniform parental
childcare norms that include children born of sex.92
II. THE FAILURE TO JUSTIFY DEFERRAL TO STATE LAWMAKING
ON FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CHILDCARE PARENTS
The United States Supreme Court has often recognized the
right of federal constitutional parental childcare as
“fundamental.”93 Yet, the Court has not clearly explained why
87
See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness & Zachary Townsend, For Those Not John
Edwards: More and Better Paternity Acknowledgments at Birth, 40 U. BALT. L. REV.
53, 56 (2010) (explaining that states have applied the congressional guidelines on
voluntary parentage acknowledgments both in and outside of welfare settings).
88
Id. at 56–59.
89
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
90
See, e.g., id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (“[Congress shall] make all Laws . . . necessary
and proper for carrying into Execution [the specifically enumerated legislative
powers]”).
91
See, e.g., Andrea Preisler, Note, Assisted Reproductive Technology: The
Dangers of an Unregulated Market and the Need for Reform, 15 DEPAUL J. HEALTH
CARE L. 213, 214 (2013) (explaining how such guidelines might operate); Benjamin
B. Williams, Note, Screening for Children: Choice and Chance in the “Wild West” of
Reproductive Medicine, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1305, 1307 (2011).
92
Ann Laquer Estin, Sharing Governance: Family Law in Congress and the
States, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 267, 333–34 (2009) (reviewing how Congress
has already utilized its legislative authority in enforcement, spending, and
interstate commerce matters to unify family laws in the United States, and
concluding that while Congress has substantial authority over family law matters, it
should limit its national family legislation to subjects for which there is broad
political consensus and strong state support); see also Elizabeth G. Patterson,
Unintended Consequences: Why Congress Should Tread Lightly When Entering the
Field of Family Law, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 397, 398–99 (2008) (reviewing
congressional initiatives conditioning the receipt of federal funds on family law
mandates).
93
See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997)
(“[F]undamental rights and liberty interests [include the right] “to direct the
education and upbringing of one’s children.”); Santosky II v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,
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the rightsholders for this right are substantially defined by state
lawmakers. The state laws on rightsholders—typically male for
now, though this is changing given rapidly expanding uses of
assisted reproduction, including surrogacy—frequently differ.
Husbands of birth mothers vary in their federally protected
childcare interests per state presumed parent laws,94 as do
unwed biological fathers who conceive children by consensual sex
with married women.95 State laws on childcare rightsholders
vary widely today for both parentage establishment and
disestablishment.96
Explanatory failures by the Supreme Court abound in the
2000 Troxel case on parental childcare where grandparents
sought court-ordered child visitation over parental objections.
Court statements recognizing broad state lawmaking authority
on parentage prompting federal constitutional childcare are
753 (1982) (finding “fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care,
custody, and management of their child” is protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) (“[F]undamental rights
and interests [include] the traditional interest of parents with respect to the
religious upbringing of their children . . . .”); see also Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573,
578–79 (Tenn. 1993) (reviewing additional Supreme Court precedents, though
employing a state constitutional privacy analysis to find application of the
Grandparents’ Visitation Act in the case was unconstitutional).
94
For example, the state laws on the marital presumptions recognizing
husbands as legal fathers vary in their establishment standards. Compare, e.g.,
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209C, § 6(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through ch. 295 of the
2016 2d Ann. Sess.) (establishing that husband is presumed father of child “born
during the marriage”), and NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.051(1)(a) (West, Westlaw
through 78th Reg. Sess. (2015) and 29th Spec. Sess. (2015)) (similar), with ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-814(A)(1) (Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. Sess. of the 52d Leg.)
(establishing that the presumed father is the man to whom the birth mother was
married at any time in the ten months immediately preceding the birth of the child),
and MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1027(c)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2016
legislation) (establishing that presumed father is “man to whom” child’s “mother was
married at the time of conception”).
95
For example, where their mates are married to other men, state laws on the
rebutting by biological fathers of the marital paternity presumptions favoring
husbands vary. Compare, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-204(1)(a) (West, Westlaw
through 2016 3d Spec. Sess.) (presuming that a husband is the father of a child if the
child is born during his marriage to the child’s mother), with L.A. Cty. Dep’t of
Children & Family Servs. v. Heriberto C. (In re Jesusa V.), 85 P.3d 2, 11 (Cal. 2004)
(holding biological father and husband can each raise a presumption of paternity,
often prompting a judicial decision on which presumption should be maintained).
96
See Parness & Townsend, supra note 87, at 63–87 (demonstrating differences
in American state laws on establishing and recognizing voluntary paternity
acknowledgments); see also supra notes 48 (marital parentage presumptions), 57–59
(marital parentage presumptions), 66–67 (de facto, presumed, and equitable
parentage) and accompanying text.
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made without significant judicial elaboration on policy and
without judicial references to relevant precedents. In dissent,
Justice Stevens said: “It is indisputably the business of the
States, rather than a federal court employing a national
standard, to assess in the first instance the relative importance
of the conflicting interests that give rise to disputes such as
this.”97 He noted a few Supreme Court precedents, including one
indicating it is best to leave “matters involving competing and
multifaceted
social
and
policy
decisions”
to
“local
decisionmaking,” which he deemed to mean that “caution” for the
Court was “never more essential than in the realm of family and
intimate relations.”98 He did not explain why the Court was not
as cautious regarding the family relations areas of abortion and
contraception.
Justice Scalia, also in dissent, deemed “state legislatures” far
better suited than the Court to craft “definition[s] of parents”
possessing the “unenumerated parental rights” recognized in
federal constitutional precedents, which he “would not now
overrule.”99
And Justice Kennedy, in dissent, recognized that one fit
parent’s federal constitutional childcare rights might be limited
by “a de facto parent” doctrine, where the “family courts in the 50
States . . . are best situated to consider the unpredictable, yet
inevitable, issues that arise.”100 This observation was founded on
the preexisting diversity subject matter jurisdiction limit on
federal district courts issuing divorce, alimony, or child custody
decrees.101
Similar statements appear beyond dissents and outside of
grandparent visitation settings. In an adoption case, a majority
of the Supreme Court simply observed that in “the vast majority
of cases,” state laws govern “the legal problems arising from the
97

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 90 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 90 n.10 (citing Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 128
(1992)).
99
Id. at 92–93 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
100
Id. at 101 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504
U.S. 689, 703–04 (1992)).
101
More particularly, Justice Kennedy relied upon Ankenbrandt, where the
Court was only concerned with the long history of absence of federal court subject
matter jurisdiction over divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees, and the special
state court proficiencies to monitor compliance with such decrees, and not with the
absence of federal court authority to define federal constitutional rightsholders.
Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 703–04.
98
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parent-child relationship.”102 In a property setting involving “a
conflict between federal and state rules for the allocation of a
federal entitlement,” a Supreme Court majority observed state
“family and family-property law” must do “ ‘major damage’ to
‘clear and substantial’ federal interests” before such a law will be
overridden.103 While perhaps in the past the harms caused by
interstate parentage law variations were not “major,” today there
is “major damage,” as new forms of biological and nonbiological
parentage have risen sharply, particularly with the increases in
the numbers of nonmarital children,104 children born of assisted
reproduction technologies,105 and children “informally” adopted.106
Commentaries on these Supreme Court pronouncements on
deference to states generally are unsatisfactory and often
conclusory.107 One author wrote:
102

Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256 (1983).
Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581–82 (1979) (quoting United
States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966)); see also Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct.
1943, 1950 (2013) (employing Hisquierdo in a different property setting); Rose v.
Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 625 (1987) (employing the same language used in Hisquierdo
and Yazell in a different property setting).
104
See, e.g., Katharine K. Baker, Bionormativity and the Construction of
Parenthood, 42 GA. L. REV. 649, 652 n.9 (2008); Joyce A. Martin et al., Births: Final
Data for 2013, in 64 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP. NO. 1, 38–40 (2015), https://www.cdc.
gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr64/nvsr64_01.pdf; ELIZABETH WILDSMITH ET AL., CHILD
TRENDS, PUB. NO. 2011-29, CHILDBEARING OUTSIDE OF MARRIAGE: ESTIMATES AND
TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2011), http://www.childtrends.org/wp-content/up
loads/2013/02/Child_Trends-2011_11_01_RB_NonmaritalCB.pdf (“In 2009, 41
percent of all births (about 1.7 million) occurred outside of marriage, compared with
28 percent of all births in 1990 and just 11 percent of all births in 1970.”).
105
On the history of assisted human reproduction, and the recent growth in free
private sperm donation, see Lauren Gill, Note, Who’s Your Daddy? Defining
Paternity Rights in the Context of Free, Private Sperm Donation, 54 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1715, 1719–25 (2013). On the increases in assisted human reproduction on a
“do-it-yourself” basis, making governmental regulation more difficult, see, for
example, A.A.B. v. B.O.C., 112 So. 3d 761, 764 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
106
Herein, “informal adoptions” most significantly include recognitions of a
second parent for a child with a single parent where the second parent is on equal
footing with the established parent and achieves parental status, without formal
adoption, through parental-like acts, utilizing such doctrines as presumed or de facto
parenthood. On the rise of such doctrines, see, for example, Parness, Parentage Law
(R)Evolution, supra note 66, at 764–65.
107
See, e.g., Katharine K. Baker, Marriage and Parenthood as Status and
Rights: The Growing, Problematic and Possibly Constitutional Trend To
Disaggregate Family Status from Family Rights, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 127, 151 (2010)
[hereinafter Baker, Marriage and Parenthood] (footnote omitted) (“[F]ew people
question the state’s ability to honor, or not, surrogacy contracts; to recognize, or not,
second-parent adoption; and to determine, for the most part, who is entitled to
parental status.”).
103
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Some federal activity in the family law realm is unavoidable
and even desirable. . . . The federal attention can become
pernicious, however, if federal program requirements demand
changes in state law that could disrupt the fabric of family law
and policy in a state. Because family policy is closely connected
to community norms and local social cohesion, such disruptions
can have deleterious social effects that were neither anticipated
nor desired by Congress. These disruptions can be, and
sometimes are, avoided by a less prescriptive federal
approach . . . .108

Yet, the avoidance of “deleterious social effects” that upset
“community norms and local social cohesion” is not so important
as to preclude federal constitutional norms on rightsholders
implicating “family law and policy” in such realms as abortion,
sexual conduct, and same-sex marriage.109
In a 1992 ruling, often relied upon in judicial opinions where
public policy explanations are otherwise wanting, the Supreme
Court did articulate a cogent rationale for limiting federal
district court subject matter jurisdiction in certain “family policy”
cases.110 It deemed such jurisdiction could not be exercised when
“divorce and alimony decrees and child custody orders” are
sought.111 It explained:
Issuance of decrees of this type not infrequently involves
retention of jurisdiction by the court and deployment of social
workers to monitor compliance.
As a matter of judicial
economy, state courts are more eminently suited to work of this
type than are federal courts, which lack the close association
with state and local government organizations dedicated to
handling issues that arise out of conflicts over divorce, alimony,
and child custody decrees. Moreover, as a matter of judicial
expertise, it makes far more sense to retain the rule that federal
courts lack power to issue these types of decrees because of the
special proficiency developed by state tribunals . . . .112

108
Patterson, supra note 92, at 399; see also id. at 433 (noting that the Supreme
Court recognizes “community morality, order, and cohesion” in limiting federal
lawmaking on family matters).
109
Other critics of the “less prescriptive federal approach” to family law issues
focus on matters outside of federal constitutional childcare parents. See, e.g.,
Courtney G. Joslin, The Perils of Family Law Localism, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 623,
626 (2014) (reviewing the critics).
110
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992).
111
Id. at 703.
112
Id. at 703–04.
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Yet, the more particular articulation of who are federal
constitutional childcare rightholders, without determining which
parent has custody, visitation, parenting time, or the like, should
prompt no concerns over later monitoring, implicate no ties to
local government organizations, nor require judicial expertise
developed only in state courts.
This rationale from 1992 sometimes is read too generally and
taken out of context. Thus, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit in 2015 declared: “And if the plaintiff
requests that a federal court determine who should have care for
and control a child, then that request is outside the jurisdiction of
the federal courts.”113 Yet, the court also recognized that the
1992 precedent was limited to barriers to federal court
resolutions of who should have custody, as only then would there
often be “continuing judicial supervision of a volatile family
situation” and the “deployment of social workers to monitor
compliance.”114 Fact-dependent issues of who should be awarded
childcare differ from general norms on who can seek childcare.
With the latter, there is no need for continuing jurisdiction or
deployment of social workers.115
III. THE RESULTS OF AND THE PROBLEMS WITH DEFERRING
LAWMAKING TO STATES
The absence of federal laws significantly limiting state
lawmaking on who may be federal constitutional parental child
caretakers has resulted in a proliferation of widely varying state
parentage laws relevant to federal constitutional childcare.
Divergence arises, in part, due to the variation among separation
of powers approaches to state judicial common lawmaking when
statutes are wholly silent or incomplete,116 as they often are, as
113

Chevalier v. Estate of Barnhart, 803 F.3d 789, 797 (6th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 794, 797 (quoting Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 704; Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694
F.2d 489, 492 (7th Cir. 1982)); see also Alexander v. Rosen, 804 F.3d 1203, 1205 (6th
Cir. 2015) (deeming Chevalier applicable to a narrow range of cases, including those
involving who gets child custody and the calculation of child support payments).
115
Chevalier, 803 F.3d at 797.
116
Compare, e.g., Pitts v. Moore, 2014 ME 59, ¶¶ 18–19, 90 A.3d 1169, 1176–77
(plurality opinion) (noting that while “[p]arenthood is meant to be defined by the
Legislature,” after thirteen years of noting a statutory need for a de facto parent
doctrine, three justices concluded “we must provide some guidance”), with Moreau v.
Sylvester, 2014 VT 31, ¶ 26, 196 Vt. 183, 196, 95 A.3d 416, 425 (declining to
formulate a non-statutory de facto parent doctrine and noting that other courts have
similarly declined to fill the “perceived vacuum”). A new Parentage Act took effect in
114
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well as to varied approaches to recognizing state constitutional
parental childcare rights.117 Beyond these variations there are
significant interstate differences in the substantive parentage
childcare laws grounded on biological ties to children, functional
parenthood, and contractual parentage.118
A.

Biological Ties

On the import of biological ties for childcare purposes, state
law variations appear both in and outside of assisted human
reproduction (“AHR”) settings. For AHR involving surrogates,
that is, women giving birth who do not intend to parent,
including women who utilize the eggs of other women who do
intend to parent, the surrogates may or may not be the legal
parents at birth. Some states effectively allow preconception
waivers of any parental rights by surrogates,119 as well as
Maine on July 1, 2016. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-a, §§ 1831–1939 (Westlaw
through 2015 2d Reg. Sess. of the 127th Leg.).
117
See, e.g., Callender v. Skiles, 591 N.W.2d 182, 190 (Iowa 1999) (concluding
that an unwed biological father of a child born to a woman married to another man
had a constitutional due process “liberty interest” in Iowa when he challenged the
husband’s paternity); Jensen v. Cunningham, 2011 UT 17, ¶ 73, 250 P.3d 465, 484
(stating that a state constitutional due process liberty interest of parents “to
maintain ties to” their children includes “a fundamental right to make decisions
concerning the care and control of their children”); LP v. LF, 2014 WY 152, ¶ 57, 338
P.3d 908, 921 (Wyo. 2014) (declining to adopt de facto parentage or the parentage by
estoppel doctrine, “instead leaving that important policy decision to the Wyoming
Legislature”). For a discussion of when state constitutions will more likely be read to
provide broader protections of individual rights, see, for example, Hodes & Nauser,
MDs, P.A. v. Schmidt, 368 P.3d 667, 702 (Kan. Ct. App. 2016) (en banc) (Malone,
C.J., dissenting) (noting that coextensive interpretations of federal and state
constitutions generally occur “only when the provisions themselves are similar”),
review granted (Apr. 11, 2016).
118
See Leslie Joan Harris, The Basis for Legal Parentage and the Clash Between
Custody and Child Support, 42 IND. L. REV. 611, 622–26 (2009).
119
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15(1), (3)(c) (West, Westlaw through 2016 2d
Reg. Sess. of the 24th Leg.) (providing that “[p]rior to engaging in gestational
surrogacy, a binding and enforceable gestational surrogacy contract shall be made”
wherein typically a “gestational surrogate agrees to relinquish any parental rights
upon the child’s birth”); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/25(b)(2), (c)(1)(ii) (West,
Westlaw through Act 99-930 of the 2016 Reg. Sess.) (similar); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 168-B:11(A)(II) (Westlaw through ch. 330 of the 2016 Reg. Sess.) (“[The gestational
carrier agreement] shall be executed prior to the commencement of any medical
procedures to impregnate the gestational carrier.”). Where gestational surrogates
are married, their spouses may also contractually waive any parental rights prior to
conception. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/25(b)(2)(i) (West, Westlaw
through Act 99-930 of the 2016 Reg. Sess.) (providing that “gestational surrogacy
contract” shall be executed by the “gestational surrogate’s husband”).
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adoptions of any future children by intended parents, who may
not need to have been married120 but may need to have
contributed genetic material prompting birth.121 Other states
decline to enforce surrogacy pacts.122
For AHR where a birth mother intends to parent, her
husband may or may not be a legal parent, depending on
whether his sperm was employed.123 For AHR births to unwed
mothers, sperm donors may be statutorily barred from paternity
of any later-born child.124
Biological ties also prompt variations in state parentage laws
when children are born of sex. While presumed biological ties in
husbands whose wives give birth generally result in legal
paternity,125 the timing of the necessary marriage differs
interstate. State legislators have alternatively used the timing of

120
See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.590 (West, Westlaw through 78th Reg.
Sess. (2015) and 29th Spec. Sess. (2015)).
121
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15(3)(e) (West, Westlaw through 2016 2d
Reg. Sess. of the 24th Leg.) (stating that the gestational surrogate must agree to
“assume parental rights and responsibilities . . . if it is determined that neither
member of the commissioning couple is the genetic parent”); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 47/20(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through Act 99-930 of the 2016 Reg. Sess.) (stating
that where there are two intended parents, at least one must contribute gametes).
122
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218(A) (Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg.
Sess. of the 52d Leg.); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-20-1-1 (West, Westlaw through 2016
legislation); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.855 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg.
Sess. of the 98th Leg.). For a review of the “wide spectrum of legal regimes” on
surrogacy in the United States, see Peter Nicolas, Straddling the Columbia: A
Constitutional Law Professor’s Musings on Circumventing Washington State’s
Criminal Prohibition on Compensated Surrogacy, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1235, 1239–45
(2014).
123
See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/3 (West, Westlaw through Act 99-930
of the 2016 Reg. Sess.) (repealed 2017) (differing consent requirements for husbands
who are and are not the sperm donors). Thus, husbands in nonsurrogacy AHR
settings may not always be presumed biological fathers of children born to their
wives. Elsewhere, husbands are presumed fathers if they consent in the same way,
regardless of whether or not their sperm was used. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., EST. &
TRUSTS § 1-206(b) (West, Westlaw through 2016 legislation) (employed in a divorce
and child support setting in Sieglein v. Schmidt, 120 A.3d 790, 793–94 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2015)).
124
Compare, e.g., Steven S. v. Deborah D., 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 482, 487 (Ct. App.
2005) (holding no paternity for sperm donor regardless of intent), with In Interest of
R.C., 775 P.2d 27, 35 (Colo. 1989) (en banc), and C.O. v. W.S., 639 N.E.2d 523, 525
(Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1994).
125
On marital paternity presumptions, see Carbone & Cahn, supra note 50, at
219, 221–28; see also Gartner v. Iowa Dep’t of Pub. Health, 830 N.W.2d 335, 345 n.1
(Iowa 2013) (describing varying state laws).
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marriage relative to conception, pregnancy, and/or birth.126
Further, there are variations in the standing of those who can
disestablish parentage by challenging marital parentage
presumptions.127
B.

Functional Parenthood

As to functional parenthood for federal childcare purposes,
where there are parental-like acts and where there need not be
either biological ties or any parentage contract, state laws vary in
naming the doctrines. There are statutes and judicial precedents
on, for example, de facto parents and presumed parents.128
More importantly, there are widely varying standards on
functional parenthood.
For example, some state laws on
“presumed” parentage outside of marriage require residency with
the child since birth,129 while others require no minimum period
of household residency130 or no household residency at all.131

126
Compare, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 126.051 (1)(a) (West, Westlaw through
78th Reg. Sess. (2015) and 29th Spec. Sess. (2015)) (establishing presumption of
husband’s paternity if child is “born during the marriage”), with ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 25-814(A)(1) (Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. Sess. of the 52d Leg.) (“married
at any time in the ten months immediately preceding the birth”), and MD. CODE
ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-1027(c)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2016 legislation)
(establishing presumption of husband’s paternity if he and the child’s mother are
“married at the time of conception”).
127
Compare, e.g., B.C. v. J.S.U., 158 So. 3d 464, 467 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014)
(holding biological father of child born to woman married to another man cannot
assert parentage when husband persists in his presumption of paternity), and
Strauser v. Stahr, 726 A.2d 1052, 1055–56 (Pa. 1999) (similar), with L.A. Cty. Dep’t
of Children & Family Servs. v. Heriberto C. (In re Jesusa V.), 85 P.3d 2, 11 (Cal.
2004) (holding both husband and biological father of child born to wife can meet
criteria for “presumed” paternity, and a court often must decide which one of the two
presumptions to sustain), and Waites v. Ritchie (In re Waites), 2012-CT-00884-SCT
(¶ 19) (Miss. 2014), 152 So. 3d 306, 314 (holding that for child born into marriage,
unwed biological father nevertheless entitled to “natural-parent presumption”).
128
See, e.g., Parness, Parentage Law (R)Evolution, supra note 66, 752–63
(providing an overview of evolving state parentage laws). In Delaware, there are
statutory parents both via de facto status and presumptions. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13,
§ 8-201(c) (LEXIS through 80 Del. Laws 2016, ch. 430); id. § 8-204(a).
129
See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.204(a)(5) (West, Westlaw through 2015
Reg. Sess. of the 84th Leg.); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.116(2) (West, Westlaw
through 2016 Reg. Sess. and 1st Spec. Sess.).
130
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-4-105(1)(d) (LEXIS through 2016 2d Reg.
Sess. of the 70th Gen. Assemb.) (receipt of child into home); MONT. CODE ANN. § 406-105(1)(d) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Legis. Sess.) (similar); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:17-43(a)(4) (West, Westlaw through 2016 legislation) (similar).
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Some state laws recognize a functional parent where there
already exist, and will remain, two other parents under law.132
Incidentally, in settings where there are biological ties but no
earlier functioning as a parent so that there are no childcare
opportunities, child support obligations can still be imposed.133
C.

Contractual Parentage

There are also variations in state laws regarding contractual
parentage for childcare purposes. With AHR nonsurrogacy
births, some state statutes speak to both marital and nonmarital
settings,134 while others expressly address only the written
consent of a husband to parenthood when his wife seeks to
deliver a child born with anonymously donated sperm.135 When
statutes do not cover all AHR nonsurrogacy births, courts can
extend contractual parentage opportunities, as with unwed
sperm donors who are recognized as childcare parents,136 as well
131
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17-204(a)(5) (Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess. and
Act 2016-485 of the 2016 1st Spec. Sess.) (stating that a presumed parent
establishes “a significant parental relationship”).
132
See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(c) (West, Westlaw through ch. 893 of the
2016 Reg. Sess. and ch. 8 of the 2015–2016 2d Exec. Sess.) (failing to recognize three
parents would be “detrimental to the child”). See also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-a,
§§ 1851(1), 1881(1)(A), 1891(3)(A)–(C) (Westlaw through 2015 2d Reg. Sess. of the
127th Leg.) (establishing that parents include birth mother, husband as presumed
parent, and de facto parent via, for example, residence, consistent “caretaking,” and
a “bonded and dependent relationship”); id. § 1891(5) (adjudication of de facto
parentage “does not disestablish the parentage” of others).
133
See, e.g., N.E. v. Hedges, 391 F.3d 832, 836 (6th Cir. 2004); A.S. v. Gift of Life
Adoptions, Inc. (In re Adoption of Baby A.), 944 So. 2d 380, 395 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2006).
134
See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.89, 3111.88(C) (West, Westlaw
through File 123 of the 131st Gen. Assemb. (2015–2016)) (addressing “non-spousal
artificial insemination for the purpose of impregnating a woman so that she can bear
a child that she intends to raise as her child” through using “the semen of a man
who is not her husband”). “[D]ue process safeguards,” however, may prompt some
sperm donors to be fathers under Ohio’s statute. C.O. v. W.S., 639 N.E.2d 523, 525
(Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1994). See also CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7613, 7962 (West, Westlaw
through ch. 893 of the 2016 Reg. Sess. and ch. 8 of the 2015–2016 2d Exec. Sess.)
(addressing AHR outside surrogacy and AHR with gestational carriers); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19-a, §§ 1921–1929, 1931–1939 (Westlaw through 2015 2d Reg. Sess.
of the 127th Leg.) (AHR outside marital setting and gestational carrier agreements).
135
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201(a) (LEXIS through 2016 2d Extra. Sess.,
2016 Fiscal Sess., and 2016 3d Extra. Sess. of the 90th Gen. Assemb.); 750 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/3(a), (b) (West, Westlaw through Act 99-930 of the 2016 Reg.
Sess.) (repealed 2017) (stating that a sperm donor is not treated as the “natural
father” unless his wife is inseminated).
136
See, e.g., Breit v. Mason, 718 S.E.2d 482, 489 (Va. Ct. App. 2011).
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as with husbands recognized as childcare parents when their
wives conceive without medical assistance via sperm donated by
one known to the married couple.137 Other states have statutes
outside marital settings, as when unwed women can secure legal
parentage via an AHR birth where sperm donors generally are
not parents under law.138
In AHR surrogacy settings, some state laws explicitly
require husbands of projected surrogates to consent in writing to
an absence of future legal paternity.139 Some state laws allow
nonegg or nonsemen donors to become legal parents via
surrogacy pacts,140 while others do not.141 Some state laws
prohibit surrogacy contracts altogether.142 Some states, under
certain circumstances, allow men alone to become legal parents
via AHR surrogacy.143 On the range of state laws, one judge of a
state high court, upon reviewing existing laws and
137
See, e.g., Engelking v. Engelking, 982 N.E.2d 326, 327–28 (Ind. Ct. App.
2013) (relying on a husband’s voluntary consent to artificial insemination as well as
the statute on a “child of the marriage”).
138
See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-775 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Feb.
Reg. Sess., 2016 May Spec. Sess., and 2016 Sept. Spec. Sess.).
139
See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/25(b)(2)(i) (West, Westlaw through
Act 99-930 of the 2016 Reg. Sess.) (requiring execution of gestational surrogacy
contract by gestational surrogate’s husband “prior to the commencement of any
medical procedures”).
140
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15 (West, Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg.
Sess. of the 24th Leg.); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/20(b) (West, Westlaw through
Act 99-930 of the 2016 Reg. Sess.) (establishing that where there are two intended
parents, at least one must contribute gametes and there must be “a medical need”
for gestational surrogacy); see also In re Baby S., 2015 PA Super 244, 128 A.3d 296,
306–07 (holding that the nonegg donor was the legal mother of child born to
surrogate even though there was no statute on point).
141
See, e.g., In re T.J.S., 16 A.3d 386, 391 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011)
(finding that the wife of a sperm donor who employed a surrogate needed to adopt to
become a parent under law as she was not an ovum donor), aff’d by an equally
divided court, 54 A.3d 263 (per curiam) (N.J. 2012).
142
See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-20-1-1 (West, Westlaw through 2016
legislation); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.855 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg.
Sess. of the 98th Leg.).
143
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201(c)(1)(B) (LEXIS through 2016 2d Extra.
Sess., 2016 Fiscal Sess., and 2016 3d Extra. Sess. of the 90th Gen. Assemb.) (stating
that unwed sperm donors can utilize surrogates in which case the child is the legal
child of only the unwed sperm donor, that is, the biological father); In re Roberto
d.B., 923 A.2d 115, 131–32 (Md. 2007) (similar). Cf. In re Paternity of Infant T., 991
N.E.2d 596, 597–98 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (finding unwed sperm donor could
disestablish paternity of surrogate’s husband who consented to disestablishment,
but could not disestablish maternity of surrogate who gave birth even though she too
had agreed to disestablishment, because there would otherwise be no legal second
parent).
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commentaries, concluded: “Beyond the fact that there is no clear
majority approach to surrogacy among the states that have acted,
many states still have said virtually nothing on the topic. Among
those that have acted, the legislative approach varies
significantly from state to state.”144
Outside of AHR, there are significant variations in state
laws on contracts involving legal parenthood. Thus, only some
state laws afford legal parenthood to a second parent where an
existing single parent expressly supports and consents to the
second parent’s earlier child caretaking.145 Only some states
grant legal parenthood to a second parent based on a single
parent’s passive acquiescence.146
D. The Problems
Should federal constitutional childcare rightsholders, now
guided by widely varying state law norms on parentage
establishment and disestablishment, continue to be so different?
Not if one believes equality principles demand that federal
constitutional childcare rightsholders should be comparably
defined regardless of where they live.147 Beyond equality, current

144
In re F.T.R., 2013 WI 66, ¶ 92, 349 Wis. 2d 84, 129, 833 N.W.2d 634, 656
(Abrahamson, C.J., concurring); see also KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 4, at
157–203, 203–11 (reviewing surrogacy laws in the United States as well as
international surrogacy laws); Joseph F. Morrissey, Surrogacy: The Process, the
Law, and the Contracts, 51 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 459, 486–503 (2015) (reviewing
American state surrogacy laws); Leora I. Gabry, Note, Procreating Without
Pregnancy: Surrogacy and the Need for a Comprehensive Regulatory Scheme, 45
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 415, 421–31 (2012) (reviewing American state surrogacy
laws).
145
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c) (LEXIS through 80 Del. Laws
2016, ch. 430) (establishing de facto parent where there is the “support and consent”
of the child’s single parent); Bancroft v. Jameson, 19 A.3d 730, 750 (Del. Fam. Ct.
2010) (stating that statute is unconstitutional if read to allow a de facto parent
where there already exist two fit parents). But cf. Barone v. Chapman-Cleland, 10
N.Y.S.3d 380, 381 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) (holding that same-sex partner of a birth
mother having no childcare interest as “equitable estoppel” did not bar mother’s
superior childcare rights when partnership dissolved, though the partner had coparented for some time with the birth mother’s consent), rev’d, Brooke S.B. v.
Elizabeth A.C.C., 61 N.E.3d 488 (N.Y. 2016).
146
See, e.g., S.Y. v. S.B., 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 3, 11 (Ct. App. 2011) (employing
§ 7611(d) of the California Family Code, and presuming second parent need not be
intended by existing parent to “obtain any legal rights,” but any second parent must
have received child into the home and openly held out the child as one’s own).
147
The interstate variations on who are parents in childcare settings seemingly
are subject to a Fifth Amendment Due Process analysis, where the focus would
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American state law differences have prompted other significant
problems.
One problem is that many Americans do not
understand the import of the broad state parentage lawmaking
discretion and the resulting interstate variations in parental
childcare opportunities and responsibilities. Like Maury Povich,
some believe that legal parentage depends only upon biology or
formal adoption.148 While over time a better understanding
might develop, there are further problems.
Many Americans do not understand that differing terms can
have comparable meanings and similar terms can have differing
meanings from state to state. For example, de facto parenthood
in one state can be comparable to presumed parenthood in a
second state, while presumed parenthood can have a number of
meanings across states.149 New United States Supreme Court
precedents on federal constitutional childcare parents likely will
unify American state parental childcare nomenclature.
Another problem involves the uncertainties about legal
parentage when people move across state borders where very
different parentage norms apply. For example, a person can
meet the de facto parent norm in State A, followed by the child’s
move to State B where there is no such norm. Typically, in a
later childcare dispute in State B, a court in State B will apply
the parentage laws of State B, though most, if not all, of the
childcare relevant to any de facto parentage in the person left
behind in State A occurred in State A.150 As legal parentage
norms untied to biology and formal adoption become more

likely be on congressional failures regarding comparably situated child caretakers,
rather than Supreme Court failures.
148
See generally Janis Prince Inniss, What Makes a Real Parent?, EVERYDAY
SOCIOLOGY BLOG (Dec. 30, 2007), http://nortonbooks.typepad.com/everydaysociology/
2007/12/what-makes-a-re.html.
149
See, e.g., Parness, Parentage Law (R)Evolution, supra note 66; see also
Gartner v. Iowa Dep’t of Pub. Health, 830 N.W.2d 335, 345–47, 346 n.1 (Iowa 2013)
(demonstrating three separate categories of American state statutes on the
parentage presumption).
150
See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, Choosing Among Imprecise American State
Parentage Laws, 76 LA. L. REV. 481, 485–86 (2015) [hereinafter Parness, Imprecise
American State Parentage Laws] (criticizing this approach and suggesting ways
state courts should employ their choice-of-law principles when parentage norms
differ between interested states).
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widespread and better-known, savvy lawyers will likely prompt
their clients to make forum-shopping moves for such purposes as
avoiding shared childcare or child support.151
Other problems spring from state law variations on those
possessing federal parental childcare rights. If family members
generally understand their own state parentage laws, and even
where there are no cross-border moves, many remain uncertain
as to who is a parent.152 Unlike parentage arising from marriage,
a birth certificate, a voluntary parentage acknowledgment, or a
formal adoption, de facto legal parentage and the like are
imprecise in that they arise from such occurrences as “parentlike” acts or “bonded and dependent relationship[s],” which must
be judicially assessed after the fact.153 There will often be great
uncertainty about how judges will rule in particular cases, even if
the fuzzy legal norms on parentage are known. Subjectivity
reigns, with few objective standards like those in formal adoption
settings.154 Uncertainty as to parentage often will make more
difficult the very personal decisions on matters like estate
planning, gifts, religious upbringing, schooling, and marriage.
New federal norms can mitigate, if not eliminate, this
uncertainty.155
Legal parentage uncertainties can arise even when parties
have earlier agreed on parentage. Such uncertainty, for example,
pervades assisted reproduction settings, as well as settings
involving childcare agreements for children born of sex. In the

151
See, e.g., Nicolas, supra note 122, at 1238–39 (“[W]e had to look outside of the
state in search of a jurisdiction with a more favorable legal atmosphere for
surrogacy.”).
152
Parness, Imprecise American State Parentage Laws, supra note 150, at 484.
153
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c) (LEXIS through 80 Del. Laws
2016, ch. 430) (de facto parent status); see also ALA. CODE § 26-17-204(a)(5)
(Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess. and Act 2016-485 of the 2016 1st Spec. Sess.)
(presumed parent provides “emotional and financial support”); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 26.26.116(2) (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess. and 1st Spec. Sess.)
(presumed parent holds out child “as his or her own”).
154
For example, certain criminal convictions are absolute barriers in all
adoption settings. For an argument on the need for more objective standards in
imprecise parentage settings, see Jeffrey A. Parness, Formalities for Informal
Adoptions, 43 CAP. U. L. REV. 373, 405 (2015) [hereinafter Parness, Informal
Adoptions].
155
For a discussion on how lawyers and judges can better handle claims
implicating imprecise parentage laws, see Jeffrey A. Parness, Challenges in
Handling Imprecise Parentage Matters, 28 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 139, 148,
155, 160–61 (2015).
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absence of unifying federal norms, states vary in their
approaches to agreements involving future parentage.156 Not all
state courts in all settings enforce childcare pacts even where the
best interests of children will be promoted.157 Some state courts
deny enforcement simply because the legislatures have not
affirmatively acted to recognize such agreements, though such
pacts have not been deemed invalid by statute.158 Significant
uncertainties on possible enforcement will continue until General
Assemblies act. Major nationwide variations will likely remain
until supreme federal laws operate. Clearly, the parentage
standardization initiatives of the Uniform Law Commission,159
the American Bar Association,160 and the American Law
Institute161 have not prompted significant interstate agreements.

156
Compare, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201(b)–(c) (LEXIS through 2016 2d
Extra. Sess., 2016 Fiscal Sess., and 2016 3d Extra. Sess. of the 90th Gen. Assemb.)
(allowing use of surrogate mothers), with MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.855 (West,
Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess. of the 98th Leg.) (“A surrogate parentage contract
is void and unenforceable . . . .”).
157
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.855 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.
of the 98th Leg.).
158
Consider, for example, the differing judicial approaches to recognizing de
facto parent status in the absence of legislation. See Pitts v. Moore, 2014 ME 59,
¶¶ 18–19, 90 A.3d 1169, 1176–77 (plurality opinion) (“Parenthood is meant to be
defined by the Legislature . . . . Although we have been discussing de facto
parenthood for almost thirteen years, there is currently no Maine statutory
reference . . . . In the absence of Legislative action . . . we must provide some
guidance . . . .”). Cf. Moreau v. Sylvester, 2014 VT 31, ¶¶ 25–26, 196 Vt. 183, 195–97,
95 A.3d 416, 424–26 (quoting Titchenal v. Dexter, 693 A.2d 682, 689 (Vt. 1997))
(declining the opportunity to formulate a non-statutory de facto parent doctrine as
“the Legislature is better equipped” to do so); see also LP v. LF, 2014 WY 152, ¶ 55,
338 P.3d 908, 921 (Wyo. 2014) (declining to adopt common law de facto parentage or
parentage by estoppel).
159
See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
160
See MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2008).
For a review of the Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology, see
generally Charles P. Kindregan, Jr., Considering Mom: Maternity and the Model Act
Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L.
601 (2009).
161
See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (AM. LAW INST. 2002); see also Michael R. Clisham & Robin
Fretwell Wilson, American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family
Dissolution, Eight Years After Adoption: Guiding Principles or Obligatory Footnote?,
42 FAM. L.Q. 573, 611, 613 (2008) (assessing the impact of Principles of the Law of
Family Dissolution and finding no significant effect to date).
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IV. POSSIBLE NEW CONGRESSIONAL LIMITS ON STATE
LAWMAKING
Greater certainty about legal parentage may not be wholly
dependent upon a unified federal constitutional approach to
federal childcare rightsholders.
Congress could redo the
voluntary paternity-acknowledgment process so as to more
clearly include only men who actually have, or reasonably believe
they have, biological ties to the acknowledged children.162
Congress could also make acknowledgments more easily
rescindable where there are no biological ties, as by eliminating
or extending the current sixty-day period for rescissions in the
absence of fraud, duress, or mistake of fact.163
Congress could, in the alternative, expand the voluntary
acknowledgment process to include certain men and women with
no biological ties, establishing a new form of informal adoption,
especially for children born of sex to unwed mothers or born of
AHR to a woman in a same-sex relationship.164
The congressional acknowledgment process was largely
developed to secure greater reimbursements of governmental
welfare aid expended to birth mothers on behalf of their
children.165 This goal could be extended to reimbursements from
the children’s nonbiological parent-like figures who are not full
legal parents, at least while they continue to act in parental-like
ways. As suggested by one voice in Troxel, there could be
gradations of nonparents as well as carefully crafted parentage
definitions.166
Such congressional revamps, however, are ill-advised. New
constraints on acknowledgments and easier rescission standards
would often harm children and upset settled familial
New expansions of acknowledgment
expectations.167

162
Currently, state laws and their acknowledgment forms vary on whether
signers must affirmatively express beliefs as to likely biological ties. Parness &
Townsend, supra note 87, at 72–73.
163
42 U.S.C.A. § 666(a)(5)(D)(ii)(I)–(II) (West 2014).
164
See, e.g., Leslie Joan Harris, Voluntary Acknowledgments of Parentage for
Same-Sex Couples, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 467, 470 (2012); Jayna
Morse Cacioppo, Note, Voluntary Acknowledgments of Paternity: Should Biology
Play a Role in Determining Who Can Be a Legal Father?, 38 IND. L. REV. 479, 489–
91 (2005).
165
Parness & Townsend, supra note 87, at 56–59.
166
530 U.S. 57, 92–93 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
167
Baker, Marriage and Parenthood, supra note 107, at 167–69.
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opportunities may not prompt greater welfare payment
reimbursements, but rather prompt the circumvention of child
protection safeguards attending formal adoptions.168
Beyond welfare reimbursements, states have wisely chosen
to employ the congressional voluntary-acknowledgment processes
for children whose birth mothers have not sought, and will not
likely seek, welfare assistance.169 To date, there have emerged no
proposed model codes or uniform laws in these settings that
could prompt greater national uniformity.
Some posit that greater certainty on legal parentage may be
attained by explicit congressional expansions of its voluntaryacknowledgment process to children with no ties to governmental
welfare, as well as to parent-like figures with no biological or
formal adoptive ties.170 Yet, nationalization of such parentage
norms outside of federal constitutional judicial precedents
seemingly is foreclosed by the Article I and other constitutional
limits on congressional authority, as well as by the related Tenth
Amendment’s reservation of certain powers to the states.171
Parents of, and parent-like figures for, children who were born of
sex, who have not benefitted personally from public assistance
programs, and who have always lived in a single state where
conception and birth occurred, are not so tied to interstate
commerce that congressional power is constitutionally
Congressional
enforcement
of
federal
authorized.172
173
constitutional rights, with the rights defined by United States
Supreme Court precedents, typically cannot encompass statutory
expansions of the rights or the rightsholders.174

168

See, e.g., Parness, Informal Adoptions, supra note 154, at 403–04.
Parness & Townsend, supra note 87, at 63–87 (comparing state voluntaryacknowledgment laws).
170
See, e.g., Katharine K. Baker, Legitimate Families and Equal Protection, 56
B.C. L. REV. 1647, 1683–90, 1695 (2015); Jeffrey A. Parness, New Federal Paternity
Laws: Securing More Fathers at Birth for the Children of Unwed Mothers, 45
BRANDEIS L.J. 59, 103 (2006); Julia Saladino, Is a Second Mommy a Good Enough
Second Parent?: Why Voluntary Acknowledgments of Paternity Should Be Available
to Lesbian Co-Parents, MOD. AM., Spring 2011, at 2, 5–6.
171
See supra notes 80–92 and accompanying text.
172
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564, 566–67 (1995) (holding that a
congressional regulation prohibiting the possession of a gun in a gun-free school
zone as applied to a local student attending a local school was not within
congressional power under the Commerce Clause).
173
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
174
See supra notes 81–85 and accompanying text.
169
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Comparably, congressional action nationalizing the norms on
parentage presumptions arising from marriage is inadvisable for
now, even if constitutionally authorized. Fourteenth Amendment
congressional enforcement authority may be available to limit
the otherwise applicable state parentage presumption laws. For
example, this authority may be used, via procedural law reforms,
to better secure the federal constitutional paternity opportunity
interests of unwed biological fathers in children born of
adulterous sex. But, the exercise of such authority now would
disrupt current state judicial child custody and support powers.
Moreover, such authority involving the interests of unwed
biological fathers in children born of sex to unwed mothers is illadvised.
Congressional enforcement action will be more
appropriate when the Supreme Court further clarifies the
substantive interests of biological fathers that it first recognized
in Lehr.
By contrast, Congress can and should act now to establish
norms guiding medical professionals and others providing AHR
services. While the federal constitutional limits on parentage
contracts in AHR settings remain unclear,175 including on
matters like waivers of abortion rights, federal statutory
standards on AHR medical providers, counselors, and other
service providers, and on information gathering attending AHR
services, are now both needed and authorized under the
Commerce Clause.176
V.

A.

POSSIBLE NEW UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT LIMITS ON
STATE LAWMAKING
New Parentage Norms

If congressional action addressing the current uncertain and
differing state parentage establishment and disestablishment
norms is constitutionally foreclosed, unwise, or otherwise

175
The state laws on surrogacy pacts, both traditional and gestational, vary
widely and continue to evolve as these agreements increase in number. See, e.g.,
Mark Strasser, Traditional Surrogacy Contracts, Partial Enforcement, and the
Challenge for Family Law, 18 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 85, 85–86 (2015); see also
sources cited supra note 144.
176
See, e.g., Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1520–21 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding
that reproductive services are commercial activities subject to congressional
regulation).
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unavailable, the United States Supreme Court can act to further
unify federal childcare norms across the country by limiting the
current broad state lawmaking on federal constitutional
childcare rightsholders.177 Some problems arising from the
interstate variations on legal parentage would dissipate if the
Court resolved a few major issues.
One major issue is whether a male sperm donor in an AHR
setting has the same paternity opportunity interest for
parenthood as does a male whose consensual sex prompts the
birth of his biological offspring.178 If there are similar interests,
related questions involve how and when these interests may be
asserted,179 how and when these interests might be waived—
including whether valid preconception, or postconception but
prebirth, waivers may be undertaken180—and, given the Michael
H. precedent, whether any paternity opportunity interest in the
male sperm donor can always be foreclosed if there is a resulting
birth into an intact family, be it same- or opposite-sex.181 Sperm
177
See, e.g., Mutcherson, supra note 78, at 42, 54–55 (discussing possible bases
for Supreme Court action in AHR, and suggesting “justice framework” rather than
liberty/autonomy or equality framework, with federal constitutional protections
different for those in non-coital reproduction who do or do not procreate for profit).
178
The nature of such a paternity opportunity interest, that is, a fundamental
right or a right subject to state override as long as laws are rational and not
arbitrary, is subject to some debate. See, e.g., In Interest of R.C., 775 P.2d 27, 35
(Colo. 1989) (en banc) (declining to decide if statute on lack of paternity in a sperm
donor in an AHR setting infringed upon a federal constitutional childcare interest
where the donor had both a pre-conception intent to parent and post-birth contact
with the child); C.O. v. W.S., 639 N.E.2d 523, 525 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1994) (affording
“due process safeguards” where AHR sperm donor and birth mother agreed before
implantation “that there would be a relationship between the donor and child”). But
see In re Adoption of a Minor, 29 N.E.3d 830, 836 (Mass. 2015) (holding that notice of
and consent to adoption by same-sex partner of the birth mother in AHR setting is
not required for known sperm donor “who may [only] have a theoretical basis to
attempt to establish parentage in the future”); see also Bolden v. Doe (In re Adoption
of J.S.), 2014 UT 51, ¶¶ 58–59, 358 P.3d 1009, 1025 (holding that statutes which set
forth a “statutory gateway” for unwed biological fathers to assert their parental
rights are not subject to strict scrutiny under substantive due process).
179
See, e.g., In re K.M.H., 169 P.3d 1025, 1040–41 (Kan. 2007) (finding no
infringement of substantive due process if sperm donor’s paternity opportunity
interest in a child born to an unwed birth mother is made dependent upon a writing
signed by donor and mother).
180
See, e.g., Szafranski v. Dunston, 2015 IL App (1st) 122975-B, ¶ 139, 34
N.E.3d 1132, 1164 (upholding oral contract between ex-girlfriend and ex-boyfriend
regarding cryopreserved pre-embryos; awarding ex-girlfriend “sole custody and
control”).
181
See, e.g., In re Adoption of a Minor, 29 N.E.3d at 836 (recognizing that such a
donor may sue in paternity, not commenting upon the likely result of such a suit, but
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contribution via sex might be differentiated as there, unlike AHR
settings, future pregnancy, birth, and childcare motivate the
contribution less often.
Comparably, in AHR settings, might ovum donation prompt
parentage opportunity interests for the donor, especially where,
but perhaps not just,182 the donor was in a marital or
substantially similar relationship with the birth mother and
where there was a pre-implantation agreement on dual
parentage?
Another major issue is whether a birth mother has federal
constitutional parental childcare interests if she delivers a child
born of assisted reproduction. If an assisted reproduction birth
mother always has such interests, related questions involve how
and when such interests might be waived, including whether
preconception,183 or postconception but prebirth, waivers may be
undertaken.
Of course, there is the potential for federal
constitutional differences between varying assisted reproduction
birth mothers, as between mothers who utilized or did not utilize
their own eggs184 and between mothers who are or are not
formally contracted gestational carriers.185

finding that such a donor—even if an uncle, cousin, or other family member whose
sperm was utilized by a married lesbian couple—was not automatically entitled to
notice of a proposed adoption by the birth mother’s spouse).
182
See, e.g., D.M.T. v. T.M.H., 129 So. 3d 320, 346 (Fla. 2013) (citing T.M.H. v.
D.M.T., 79 So. 3d 787, 794 n.6 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)) (distinguishing AHR cases
involving lesbian couples where the nonbirth mother was or was not an ovum donor,
that is, was or was not a “biological” or “natural” parent).
183
See, e.g., Frazier v. Goudschaal, 295 P.3d 542, 555–56 (Kan. 2013)
(concluding that a written co-parenting pact between two female partners, where
one later delivers an AHR child to be raised by both, is enforceable if the child’s best
interests are promoted).
184
See, e.g., J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1293 (D. Utah 2002) (holding
that while a woman giving birth may be presumed the legal mother at birth,
“evidence of genetic consanguinity” must dissolve that presumption in favor of legal
parentage for ova and sperm donors, a married couple, so as not to unduly burden
and frustrate the married donors’ “exercise of their constitutionally guaranteed
fundamental rights to . . . raise their own children,” with these rights originating in
both the United States Constitution and Utah’s Constitution).
185
Of course, regardless of what the Federal Constitution permits, state laws
often can further control outcomes. See, e.g., In re F.T.R., 2013 WI 66, ¶ 65, 349 Wis.
2d 84, 118, 833 N.W.2d 634, 651 (noting that surrogacy contract’s provisions on
voluntary termination of surrogate’s parental rights cannot be enforced as contrary
to statutory processes for parental rights terminations).
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Yet, another major issue is whether a current single legal
parent may have his or her federal constitutional childcare
interests diminished, though not terminated, through the
recognition of a new legal parent with comparable federal
childcare rights arising from his or her postbirth parental-like
acts, even though there are no biological or formal adoptive ties.
If such new “de facto” parenthood is possible over a single
parent’s current objection, as now exists in some states,186 related
questions involve what minimal federal constitutional standards
must operate, including what should be the standards on written
waivers and on other single parent and de facto parent
consensual conduct, as with affirmative agreement or passive
acquiescence. Some current state de facto parent standards
seemingly are vulnerable to federal constitutional attack187 as
they are quite indefinite and lack explicit requirements on
express single parent consent to, or even passive acquiescence in,
new “de facto” parenthood in another.188

186
See, e.g., R.M. v. T.A., 182 Cal. Rptr. 3d 836, 850 (Ct. App. 2015) (rejecting
birth mother’s federal constitutional challenge to non-sperm donor’s statutory
presumed parentage in AHR setting since the court must be “satisfied the parent
permitted the person to engage with the child at a level that transforms the
interaction into a full, openly acknowledged two parent relationship”).
187
See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, Constitutional Constraints on Second Parent
Laws, 40 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 811, 837–42 (2014) [hereinafter Parness, Second Parent
Laws].
188
Passive acquiescence of a single parent to de facto parentage in another often
arises from a romantic partner’s residence with that parent and the child, combined
with the partner providing financial resources benefitting the child, who is held out
by the partner as the partner’s child. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-17-204(a)(5) (Westlaw
through 2016 Reg. Sess. and Act 2016-485 of the 2016 1st Spec. Sess.) (“presumed”
parent); CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d) (West, Westlaw through ch. 893 of the 2016 Reg.
Sess. and ch. 8 of the 2015–2016 2d Exec. Sess.) (“presumed” parent); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 257.55(1) (West, Westlaw through ch. 2 of the 2017 Reg. Sess.) (“presumed”
parent). The superior parental rights of the single parent are less likely to be an
obstacle if acquiescence to the establishment of the requirements were expressly
stated to constitute implied consent to possible later second parentage per the de
facto parent doctrine. See, e.g., Parness, Second Parent Laws, supra note 187, at
840–41. Cf. Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1566 (2013) (plurality opinion)
(recognizing “all 50 States have adopted implied consent laws that require motorists,
as a condition of operating a motor vehicle within the State, to consent to BAC
testing if they are arrested or otherwise detained on suspicion of a drunk-driving
offense,” with “significant consequences” when consent is withdrawn, though
withdrawal of consent to possible de facto parentage should be free of adverse
consequences).
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A related issue is whether two current parents may have
their federal constitutional childcare interests diminished,
though not terminated, through the recognition of a third legal
parent arising from his or her postbirth parental-like acts, even
though there are no biological or formal adoptive ties for the
third parent.189 If a third legal parent is possible over current
dual or single parent objections—due to earlier consent or
acquiescence—related questions involve what, if any, minimal
federal constitutional standards must operate. For example, if
one of two current parents with interests cannot veto any
proposed third parent who has the support of the other current
federal constitutional childcare parent, are the third parent’s
childcare interests tethered to and derived from the supporting
parent’s childcare interests? Does the third parent lose childcare
interests when the supporting parent withdraws support, loses
childcare interests himself, or dies? And must any possible third
parent be a family member, like a grandparent or stepparent?
Another federal constitutional issue is whether there may be,
automatically or otherwise, a third parent with federal
constitutional childcare interests because of his or her prebirth
rather than postbirth acts.
Prebirth acts might include
preconception donations of genetic material in assisted
reproduction settings. Prebirth acts might also include threeway voluntary acknowledgments, pledges or provisions of
financial support for the pregnancy or for the future child, and/or
pledges of future childcare, arising from premarital or
midmarriage agreements.190
Yet, another issue is whether a prospective birth mother,
who will be deemed a mother under law when she gives birth,
can waive her right to abort.191 If so, further issues involve
189
See, e.g., Bancroft v. Jameson, 19 A.3d 730, 731 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2010) (holding
that both federal and state constitutions bar legal recognition of a third childcare
parent with no biological or adoptive ties, as it would infringe on the childcare
interests of the two existing parents).
190
See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, Parentage Prenups and Midnups, 31 GA. ST. U.
L. REV. 343, 369 (2015).
191
It was reported that Tagg Romney, son of Mitt, and his wife Jen engaged a
surrogate who delivered for them twin sons pursuant to an agreement that if the
fetus—the contract referenced a “child”—was determined “to be physiologically,
genetically or chromosomally abnormal,” the abortion decision was “to be made by
the intended parents.” Id. at 346 n.15 (quoting Dave Hoffman, The Unenforceability
of Contracts To Abort, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Sept. 21, 2012), https://concurring
opinions.com/archives/2012/09/the-unenforceability-of-contracts-to-abort.html); see
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whether there can be effective waivers before as well as after
conception; whether any waivers operate comparably when
conception resulted from sex or assisted reproduction; whether
effective waivers can operate in assisted reproduction settings
both when her own or another’s eggs were used; and, whether
effective waivers depend on the prospective mother’s marital
status, and, if so, whether marital status is relevant at the time
of the waiver, conception, or pregnancy. If some waivers of the
right to abort are effective, there would be enforcement issues.
Can judicial orders forbid abortions due to earlier waivers? Who
may seek such waivers? And who has standing to enforce, given
that husbands and intended parents in surrogacy settings may
not be similarly treated?
When litigants seek guidance on these issues, the U.S.
Supreme Court should hear their cases.
B.

Other New United States Supreme Court Limits on State
Lawmaking Discretion

In addition to further unifying federal constitutional
parental childcare in the United States via new parental
childcare precedents, the Supreme Court also could further unify
childcare interests via new federal constitutional precedents
operating outside of parentage. For example, varying types of
nonparents, often called third parties, are now childcare
rightsholders under state law. Nonparents are afforded childcare
interests under state laws that differ from parental childcare
interests. Might there be federal constitutional nonparental
childcare interests for grandparents, stepparents, or others?192
Federal constitutional issues on such nonparental childcare
include whether blood ties are needed, or are especially
important so that, for example, grandparents must be
distinguished from stepparents; whether parental consent is
necessary, and, if so, whether passive acquiescence suffices; and,
what the nature of nonparental conduct required to prompt such
also I. Glenn Cohen, The Constitution and the Rights Not To Procreate, 60 STAN. L.
REV. 1135, 1191–95 (2008) (laying out a number of reasons why states may be wary
about enforcing abortion contracts).
192
M.C. v. Adoption Choices of Colo., Inc., 2014 COA 161, ¶¶ 33, 42, 369 P.3d
659, 668, 670 (finding that a prospective adoptive couple had no “protected liberty
interest in their relationship with the child they hope[d] to adopt,” where an earlier
adoption decree was voided), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. In Interest of Baby A.,
2015 CO 72, ¶ 59, 363 P.3d 193, 209.
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interests is. As with parental childcare, nonparental childcare
laws benefiting grandparents, stepparents, and others193 now
vary significantly interstate.194
The Supreme Court might also consider the federal
constitutional interests of children in certain adult childcare195 or
Here, the
in maintaining certain sibling relationships.196
rightsholders would be children who have interests in receiving
love, affection, and childcare.
Further, per new case law, children may be deemed federal
constitutional rightsholders as to information regarding their
biological roots, thereby allowing for more intelligent decisions
193
Some nonparental childcare laws now expressly include siblings and greatgrandparents. See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/607(a-3) (West, Westlaw
through Act 99-930 of the 2016 Reg. Sess.) (repealed 2016). Nonparental child
caretakers can also include adult siblings; to date, the courts have not discussed
their federal constitutional childcare interests. See, e.g., Jill Elaine Hasday, Siblings
in Law, 65 VAND. L. REV. 897, 930 (2012) (“Lastly, states should consider whether
full or half-siblings separated by divorce, the end of a nonmarital relationship, or a
parent’s death will have an enforceable right to contact, communication, and
visitation, unless a court determines that such connection would be contrary to the
best interests of one or more siblings.”).
194
See, e.g., Jeff Atkinson, Shifts in the Law Regarding the Rights of Third
Parties To Seek Visitation and Custody of Children, 47 FAM. L.Q. 1, 2–5 (2013).
195
See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130 (1989) (expressing that
the U.S. Supreme Court has not “had occasion to decide whether a child has a liberty
interest, symmetrical with that of her parent, in maintaining her filial
relationship”); M.C., 2014 COA at ¶ 53, 369 P.3d at 671 (holding child has no liberty
interest in continuing relationship with prospective adoptive couple); B.B. v. B.C. (In
re Adoption of I.B.), 19 N.E.3d 784, 791 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (concluding that
children have a “liberty interest in preserving the integrity and stability of their
existing familial relationship” with maternal grandmother who was statutorily
ineligible to adopt, but where statute was unconstitutional as applied), vacated, 32
N.E.3d 1164 (Ind. 2015); Frazier v. Goudschaal, 295 P.3d 542, 557 (Kan. 2013)
(deeming that denial to children with two parents the opportunities to continue their
childcare by a nonparent under law “impinges upon the children’s constitutional
rights”).
196
See, e.g., In re Adoption of I.B., 19 N.E.3d at 791 (concluding that siblings
have “a liberty interest in preserving the integrity and stability of their existing
familial relationship and are entitled to be free from arbitrary state action affecting
that relationship”). But see Sacramento Cty. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v.
Luke H. (In re Luke H.), 165 Cal. Rptr. 3d 63, 64–65 (Ct. App. 2013) (finding no
constitutional protection of sibling relationships over custodial parent’s objection);
Nebraska v. Jeffrey H. (In re Meridian H.), 798 N.W.2d 96, 99 (Neb. 2011) (finding
no federal or state constitutional right, to date, involving continuing sibling
relationships, as where one sibling is placed in foster care and two siblings are
adopted). Often constitutional interests are not even raised. See, e.g., B.L.M. v. A.M.,
381 S.W.3d 319, 321 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012); see also JAMES G. DWYER, THE
RELATIONSHIP RIGHTS OF CHILDREN (2006); Hasday, supra note 193 (generally
supporting a child’s interest in a continuing sibling or sibling-like relationship).
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about health care, procreation, and the like. Thus, for example,
when children born of sex are formally adopted, or about to be
adopted, by foster parents or others where the biological fathers
are unknown, state officers could be obligated to secure and
maintain information on those with biological ties for later use by
the children, at least for certain purposes like medical decision
making.197 For now, generally there are no such state laws.
There are few duties on governmental officials to identify
unknown, usually male, biological parents whose children are
placed for formal adoption.198
CONCLUSION
United States Supreme Court precedents recognize federal
constitutional childcare rights in parents that may not be easily
diminished or eliminated under law.
Yet, these childcare
rightsholders are mainly defined by state laws, which vary
widely on parentage and can be dependent upon biological ties,
functional parenthood, or contracts.
Deference to state
lawmaking here is unique as no other federal constitutional
rights depend on state law definitions of rightsholders. This
deference has led to many problems that cannot be, or should not
be, addressed by Congress. The Supreme Court should soon
answer several important questions about federal childcare
parents. This would reduce current problems and recognize
federal constitutional childcare rightsholders under national
norms as exist for all other federal constitutional rightsholders.

197
See, e.g., Ronald K. Henry, The Innocent Third Party: Victims of Paternity
Fraud, 40 FAM. L.Q. 51, 68 (2006) (“The child’s best and only interest in paternity
establishment lies in finding that child’s biological father. That child needs to know
his or her genetic heritage for medical purposes.”).
198
See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, Abortions of the Parental Prerogatives of Unwed
Natural Fathers: Deterring Lost Paternity, 53 OKLA. L. REV. 345, 348–49 (2000)
(reviewing federal substantive and procedural due process protections of unwed
biological fathers in their children and suggesting how expanded procedural
protections can deter the unwarranted abortions of male parental rights in adoption
proceedings).

